King Philip II--Spanish Armada | Instructions to the Commander of the Armada and related documents, February-June 1588

The Spanish Armada. 

A group of four documents originally from the papers of Don Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, 7th Duke of Medina Sidonia, commander of the Spanish Armada:

i) Philip II. Letter signed (“Yo el Rey”), to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, ORDERING HIM TO TAKE COMMAND OF THE ARMADA following the death of the Marquess of Santa Cruz (“...ha quedado como saveis mi arm^da Real y ‘la gente della sin dueno ni caveça propietario, por lo qual es muy necess^o y combiniente que vra llegada ha lisvoa sea lo mas breve que se pudiere…”), insisting that he reach the fleet in Lisbon no later than 1 March, emphasising the necessity of having pilots familiar with the Netherlandish coast (“…mucho haré al casso que hayan en el Armada pilotos pláticos y expertos en la navega^on de Flandes..”), and explaining the arrangements he has made for supplying pilots and charts, 1 page, folio (300 x 205mm, watermark of a Greek cross within a shield), 19 February 1588, integral address leaf (addressing Medina Sidonia as “capⁿ general del mar oceano y de la costa del andalucia”), docketed, staining, the two leaves splitting at centre-fold and fragile at folds

ii) Philip II. Document signed (“Yo el Rey”), THE KING’S FINAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ARMADA (“Instruccion delo que vos Don Juan Alonso de Guzman el bueno Duque de Medina Sidonia mi primo mi Cap.^an General del mar océano y de la costa del Andaluzia, aveys de hazer con el armada q[ue] sacays del rio y puerto de lisvoa”), beginning by emphasising that the invasion is mandated by God, which means, for example, that blasphemy must be punished severely (“…porque yendo a pelear por la causa de Nro S.^or y por la gloria de Su nombre ha de ser venerado por todos para no se hazer indignos de Su favor…”), reiterating that the primary objective is to join with the army of the Duke of Parma and facilitate the army’s transport across the Channel, with careful instructions on various aspects of his mission, including how to communicate with land forces, the need to establish rendezvous ports should the Armada be scattered by bad weather, when to engage with the English, the preferred tactics of the English navy, advising him that even if the English unite their naval forces he will still have the advantage (“…y aunq[ue] topassedes juntas las del dicho Almirante y la de Draques, será la vra superior a entrambas en la calidad, y assí, en el nombre de Dios, con tal causa como llevays podreys procurando ganarle el viento y todas las demas ventajas darles la batalla y esperar de Nro S.^or la victoria…”), emphasising the importance of collaborative leadership with Parma and also reminding him of the huge financial cost of the enterprise, 8 pages, with two integral blanks, folio (307 x 212mm, watermark of a Greek cross within a shield), Madrid, 1 April 1588, papered seal beneath the King’s signature

iii) Philip II. Document signed (“Yo el rey”), SECRET INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE SPANISH ARMADA (“Instrucion secreta para vos el Duque de Medina Sidonia mi primo mi Cap^an general del mar oceano y costa del Andaluzia”), giving him a secondary objective of seizing the Isle of Wight as a bridgehead should the landing of Parma’s army not go to plan (“…si podriades apoderaros de la isla d Wych, que no es tan fuerte que parezca que os puede resistir y ganada se podría defender y terniades puerto seguro para recoger allí la armada y hazer los effectos a que aquel sitio que es de mucha importancia abriría camino, y assi convendría mucho fortificaros bien en el…”), also instructing him only to give enclosed orders (not present) to Parma once the land invasion is under way, and if possible to capture the Portuguese Pretender Don Antonio, in Spanish, signed at the foot, 2 pages, folio (307 x 214mm, watermark of a Greek cross within a shield), Madrid, 1 April 1588, papered seal, integral blank, weak at folds

iv) 7^th Duke of Medina Sidonia. Document signed (“el duque de medina sidonia”), battle orders for the flagship of the Spanish Armada, the San Martin, (“la orden que ordeno y mando se tenga en le defensa deste galeon Real nombrado san Mⁱⁿ en que va embarcada mi persona es la siguiente”), shortly after the Armada’s departure from Lisbon, outlining the manning of the decks with arquebusiers and musketeers, naming key officers and their duties, and ordering the distribution of firefighting crew together with barrels of water and other firefighting equipment, subscribed (“Por mandado de su excelencia”) and countersigned by Hierónimo de Arceo, 5 pages, integral blank, folio (287 x 200mm, watermark of a small trefoil, circle, and heart), 7 June 1588, docketed, splitting at centre fold, some browning

AN EXCEPTIONAL SERIES OF DOCUMENTS FROM THE FINAL PLANNING STAGE OF THE SPANISH ARMADA OF 1588, INCLUDING THE KING’S FINAL ORDERS TO THE DUKE OF MEDINA SIDONIA BEFORE HE LEFT PORT.

The Armada of 1588, the most ambitious act of the Anglo-Spanish war of the late 16^th century, posed an existential threat to Queen Elizabeth and her regime. The Spanish aim was to land a battle-hardened army of 30,000 in England, overthrow the Queen, re-establish Catholicism and stamp out Protestant heresies. The Spanish army was much larger than the land forces available to Elizabeth but of course, like other would-be invaders before and since, Philip II first needed control of the Channel in order to transport his troops safely. The Spanish had spent several years building up a naval force of such magnitude that they were confident it would sweep aside resistance from the English ships. The stakes for the English naval forces could not have been higher: the invasion had the blessing of the Pope as a crusade and no contemporary could have been in any doubt at the level of violence that could be unleashed. A successful invasion might well have brought to England the levels of sectarian slaughter that were seen in contemporary France, where up to four million people died during 35 years of civil war ignited by religion; or the Low Countries, which were convulsed by the Eighty Years War; or indeed Ireland, where the Elizabethan regime entered a war of extreme brutality against the native Catholic aristocracy and their followers in the 1590s.

The commander of the Spanish Armada was Don Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, 7th Duke of Medina Sidonia, a grandee with an impeccable pedigree, huge estates in Andalusia, recognised naval administrative competence, and no significant experience at sea. The current group of documents take us from his appointment to the sailing of the Armada some three and a half months later. They reveal the optimism with which Philip II envisioned the Armada Campaign and the close attention that the King, famous for his attention to detail, paid to every aspect of the planned invasion. Indeed, the failure of the Armada can in part be traced back to decisions made in these documents.

In February 1588 Medina Sidonia was supervising the outfitting of ships in the Andalusian port of Sanlúcar when he received news that the Marquess of Santa Cruz, Commander of the Armada, was on his deathbed and the King planned to appoint him as Santa Cruz’s successor. On 16 February Medina Sidonia demurred, claiming ignorance, poverty, and seasickness. Philip II took this rejection as mere courtly modesty but in fact Medina Sidonia followed it up with a second letter on 18 February in which he refused the office in even more emphatic terms – so much so, indeed, that his friends at court intercepted the letter out of concern that it would destroy his reputation. The King never knew the gravity of Medina Sidonia’s doubts and in any case did not wait for Medina Sidonia’s written acceptance before making his decision public. Philip II’s letter to Medina Sidonia in the current group, which discusses the importance of having pilots familiar with the Flemish coast, is dated 19 February. This was just three days after Medina Sidonia had first written to turn down the appointment, and presumably before the King had received any word of his response to the proposed appointment. Nonetheless, the King optimistically hopes the letter will find Medina Sidonia already en route to the Armada at Lisbon. In fact Medina Sidonia did not leave Sanlúcar for Lisbon until 27 February, by which time he had learnt that the King had overridden his refusal of the post.

When Medina Sidonia inspected the Armada at Lisbon in March 1588 he found a significant shortfall in manpower and immediately delayed its sailing, despite knowing that Philip II was already frustrated at the delays of his plan for England. He spent the next six weeks making final preparations: recruiting men, setting in stores, ensuring that ordnance was properly positioned, in good working order, and with sufficient powder. As he was completing these preparations, he received a packet from the King that provided his final instructions. The packet included the two sets of instructions found here together with a brief covering letter and accompanying sealed instructions for Parma which were only to be opened on landing in England. The sealed instructions – which were eventually returned unopened – gave Philip’s minimum terms for negotiation should the Elizabethan regime not collapse as easily as was hoped and expected: freedom of worship for Catholics and an end to English support for the Dutch rebels.

A central question for the Armada was when and how to best engage the English fleet. It was imperative that Medina Sidonia should not be distracted from his key objective of joining forces with Parma and bringing the invading army across the Channel. The Spanish knew that the English were divided into two Squadrons, one under Drake and the other under Effingham, Lord High Admiral, and were alive to the opportunity this gave them to defeat a divided enemy. Drake’s location was uncertain but the Lord High Admiral was expected to be guarding the Thames Estuary. It was most likely, therefore, that the Armada would need to engage with the English in the Thames Estuary in order to establish a bridgehead in the north Kentish coast around Margate – but if they could achieve this objective without engaging the English, so much the better. Parma was thought to have a sufficient flotilla to bring his army across the Channel once the waters were cleared of the enemy and a bridgehead had been established. Philip correctly warns that the English tactic will be to keep a distance from the larger Spanish ships and bombard them with cannon, and urges Medina Sidonia to close, grapple, and board the enemy (in the event, the greater manoeuvrability of the English ships was to thwart this tactic). Once Parma’s army was safely landed in England, Medina Sidonia was to ensure the security the Thames Estuary (especially if the English navy had not yet been defeated) and keep the shipping lane open between the bridgehead and Flanders. The parallel Secret Instructions provide supplementary orders for Medina Sidonia. If Parma had already crossed the Channel using his own flotilla of ships before the Armada reached him, then Medina Sidonia should land his reinforcements in England and join Parma’s forces there. Should Parma and his army fail to make the crossing to England, then Medina Sidonia should seize the Isle of Wight as a basis for future operations. This last option was a reversion to earlier plans for the invasion, which had centred on the Isle of Wight as a strategic bridgehead.

The weather was against the Armada from the start. A ceremonial blessing of the fleet took place on 26 April and Medina Sidonia planned to weigh anchor the following day, but poor weather and unfavourable winds stalled departure from Lisbon for another month. There were 141 ships in the Armada and they took two days to leave port, but on 30 May the Armada was at sea and slowly sailing north.

Medina Sidonia drew up the battle orders for his flagship, the San Martin, on 7 June, as the Armada made its way up the Portuguese Atlantic coast. This is the final document preserved in the current group. He specifies the battle stations for key personnel on board. He will be stationed in the aftercastle along with the most senior people aboard, including the Prince of Asculi (purportedly a natural son of the King) and Don Jorge Manrique, the veedor general or chief administrative officer of the Armada (also was to be the man trusted by Medina Sidonia to liaise directly with the Duke of Parma when the Armada was harboured in Calais). The Armada’s ranks were swelled with young men of noble birth in search of glory, and several of these men are placed on deck (on the “plaza de armas”) where they will be the forefront of hand-to-hand fighting. The tenor of his orders makes clear the overwhelming importance of fire prevention when fighting with gunpowder on a wooden ship. Medina Sidonia assigns the infantry captain Gaspar de Hermosilla command of the gunpowder stores; places the royal constable, Tomas del Monte, under the forecastle, noting that this is close to the cooking stoves; and provides detail on the need for 100 tubs of water to be placed around the galleon together with other firefighting equipment. The San Martin had a complement of 300 soldiers to 177 seamen, a balance that was reflected throughout the Armada, and Medina Sidonia’s emphasis is emphatically on soldiers with light arms and capacity for boarding the enemy, not on the heavy naval cannons used for broadsides.

 The Armada was scattered by a gale before it even left behind the Iberian Peninsula, and spent a month repairing and restocking at La Coruña. On 29 July the Spanish finally neared the Cornish coast. They were harried by the English as they sailed the Channel: their most serious loss at this stage of the fighting was the Rosario, a galleon captained by the Commander of the Andalusian Squadron, off Portland Bill. Medina Sidonia kept true to his orders, however, and did not attempt a decisive battle with the English; he focused instead on rendezvousing with Parma and his army. It was clear by this time that Parma could not cross the Channel without the Armada to escort his unarmed barges, so the two forces were to meet at Calais. When the Armada reached Calais, however, the army was not yet ready to depart and the English, far from hiding in the Thames Estuary, were in close pursuit. On the night of 7 August they sent in fireships when the Armada was exposed in harbour, which succeeded in scattering the fleet out in open water. The following day, the English closed for battle off the port of Gravelines. The superior gunnery of the English was crucial to the battle, which resulted in the loss of five ships from the Armada and severe damage to many others – not in itself a decisive defeat, but enough to thwart the invasion. Far more ships and men were lost to gales and disease in the weeks that followed the Battle of Gravelines, as the Armada was forced north by the “Protestant wind” and had to return to Spain via Scotland and the west coast of Ireland.

Philip II’s April instructions to Medina Sidonia were an important reason for the failure of the Spanish Armada. For all his attention to detail, Philip’s plans did not adequately think through the difficulties of an amphibious invasion. He treated the transport of Parma’s army as a detail, when the rendezvous, embarkation and crossing were all fraught with difficulties. The Spanish also severely underestimated English naval resistance - as is also evident in Philip II's instructions. This overconfidence probably lay behind another mistake, which was the decision to appoint a man with such limited naval experience as Medina Sidonia to command the enterprise. These highly important documents are, therefore, key to understanding a moment of huge consequence to English and wider European history. 

PROVENANCE:

Purchased from HP Kraus, 1985

LITERATURE:

J.I. Gonzalez-Aller Hierro, et al., La Batalla del Mar Océano: vol. 4 (16 febrero 1588-1604), Tomo I-II (online edition, 2018), nos 4209, 4735, 4736, 5291; P. Pierson, Commander of the Armada (1989)