Monroe, James | "It ought not to be suspected that we are trifling with the Go[vernmen]t of France, or gaining time by an idle correspondence."

James Madison

Autograph letter signed by the fifth President ("Jas. Monroe") as United States Minister to Great Britain, 4 pages (251 x 200 mm) on a bifolium of laid paper (watermarked Posthorn), London, 21 August 1803, to Joel Barlow; a few small stains. Half red morocco slipcase, chemise.

James Monroe authorizes a $2,000,000 down payment in order to securing the Louisiana Purchase: "It ought not to be suspected that we are trifling with the Go[vernmen]t of France, or gaining time by an idle correspondence."

"Robert Livingston and James Monroe closed on the sweetest real estate deal of the millennium when they signed the Louisiana Purchase Treaty in Paris on April 30, 1803. They were authorized to pay France up to $10 million for the port of New Orleans and the Floridas. When offered the entire territory of Louisiana—an area larger than Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal combined—the American negotiators swiftly agreed to a price of $15 million. … The Louisiana Purchase added 828,000 square miles of land west of the Mississippi River to the United States. For roughly 4 cents an acre, the United States had purchased a territory whose natural resources amounted to a richness beyond anyone's wildest calculations" (NARA).

Although the Louisiana Purchase had been signed four months earlier, at the time of this letter it had not yet been ratified by Congress (and wouldn’t be until 21 October 1803), and there was some fear that the French government under Napoleon might repudiate the agreement. Monroe, then acting as minister in London, and Robert Livingston, the United States envoy to France, had at their joint disposal a sum of $2,000,000 that could, if necessary, be paid to the French government as an advance payment for the territory. 

In this important letter—evidently unknown to the editors of The Papers of James Monroe—Monroe provides Joel Barlow with letters to be delivered to Livingston and the French negotiator, François Barbé-Marbois, as well as his own authorization of the advance. Barlow was an American poet, diplomat, politician, and (since 1792) a citizen of France. American consul in Algiers from 1795 to 1797 and appointed U.S. minister to France in 1811, Barlow was at this time something of a freelance diplomat, trusted by the French as well as by Monroe.

"I commit to your care a letter to Mr. Livingston containing an act of our govt subjecting to his & my joint disposition a certain sum of money [$2,000,000] to be appropriated to our late treaty with France: also an instrument signed by me to make the appropriation of that money to that object, with a letter to him on the subject. I also commit to your care a letter to Mr. Marbois … in which I inform him that Mr. Livingston's & my power is joint; that I have executed an instrument for the proposed object & inclosed it to Mr. Livingston, on obtaining whose signature the act is complete. … I then add to Mr. Marbois that … the consul will find in this procedure a convincing proof of the fair intentions of our govt to execute the treaty with promptitude & fidelity, … that I am persuaded he will feel the disposition to make a declaration of like confidence in our government."

Monroe enjoins Barlow to handle the delivery of the letters with extreme caution and discretion: "I wish the letters to Mr. Marbois & Mr. Livingston to be delivered immediately. … If Mr. Marbois is absent I wish you to call at his office, the treasury, & commit the letter to him. … If Mr. L is absent his letter ought not to be committed to the post office. Supposing both absent it will be proper to enclose to Mr. Marbois, his, & inform him that you have one to Mr. L, which you wish him to receive without delay. …"

Monroe’s departure for Paris had been delayed by illness, and, according to Dumas Malone, his arrival—late or otherwise—was resented by Livingston: "Being confident that he had gained respect for himself in French officialdom and doubting if Monroe, who had manifested such enthusiasm for democracy when minister to France, would be welcomed by the autocratic First Consul, Livingston thought himself in better position to negotiate than his prospective colleague would be. The mission of Monroe was a blow to his vanity and was regarded by him as needless" (Jefferson the President: First Term [UVA Press, 2005], p. 289). But there was ill-feeling on both sides: Monroe’s letter reveals his impatience with Livingston, who appeared willing to authorize the advance but not to take the responsibility for it. "By Mr. M's letter to me it appears that Mr. L had given him reason to believe that he was willing to give the guaranty. … By Mr. Livingston's letter to me the contrary is evident. It is possible that Mr. Marbois may have misunderstood him; it is more probable that Mr. Livingston may have written his letter to me in that manner, to throw the whole responsibility of the measure on me, for I cannot think that he will hesitate to sign the guaranty, after what has passed. If he signs & executes the instrument, you will let the affair rest precisely where the above places it. It has been my invariable conduct to give him all the support I could with the French govt, for the credit of our own and advantage of our citizens, as from motives of delicacy to himself … but, if he refuses then I think it a duty that I owe to our govt, as well as my self to let it be known to the French Govt, that this failure is owing altogether to him: that I have done with the strictest good faith everything that I could. In that case you will show to Mr. Marbois a copy of the act of Congress and the instrument of guaranty signed by me, and give him such other information respecting the transaction. …"

"It ought not to be suspected that we are trifling with the Govt of France, or gaining time by an idle correspondence. I told Mr. M … that I would guaranty that sum, if Mr. L agreed, & I shall not retrace my steps. … I still think the measure a wise and proper one & wish it to be carried into effect. If it is not, let the true cause be known: it will then be considered a personal one, which will excite no irritation in French government towards our own. The case will be submitted to our government who will only be responsible afterwards for the part it takes. If Mr. Livingston refuses to execute the act …I do not know … that I can do anything, farther than advise the bankers to advance the money. … You may also hint to Mr. M that he had better not write me, except by necessity, on this business, for considerations of delicacy. …"

One thing that Monroe and Livingston did agree on was the necessity of President Jefferson accelerating the ratification of the treaty to forestall any attempt by Napoleon to circumvent its implementation. Because a down payment would make it more difficult for France to renege prior to ratification, Monroe proposed the use of the special appropriation of $2,000,000, and Livingston concurred. 

Initially the French had declined the offer, but in late August, Barbé-Marbois, the French treasury minister, had requested it. "Promptly forwarding an order on the British banking firm of Hope & Co. …, Monroe was astonished when Livingston refused to approve the advance, because it exceeded their powers. … The Minister to France finally signed only because he feared that he might bear the full blame if Napoleon should use their refusal as a justification for withdrawing the cession. Livingston, however, did manage to withhold his signature until news from America made it certain that the treaty would not encounter any difficulties in the Senate. Monroe's willingness to make the advance was rather risky, for the envoys had not been specifically authorized to advance a payment …" (H. Almon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity [1990], p. 221).

On the same day he wrote the present letter to Barlow, Monroe wrote somewhat more candidly about his dissension and rivalry with Livingston to Fulwar Skipwith, U.S. Consul-General in France, who assisted Livingston during the negotiation of the Louisiana Purchase: “Mr, Barlow will confer with you on a new topic in which Mr L is a party. He will shew you the papers which explain it, and he well knows the interest which you take in whatever concerns yr country, its government, & me personally to calculate on yr advice & good offices in it, if they shod be wanting. The old gentn is well disposed to throw the responsibility on me, and I am at all times willing to take what is proper, but to do justice to the affr I have deemed it necessary to go further back into the business than he may like. … It will be proper to use your usual caution & secrecy in this as in all other similar cases. … I hope you have kept or will keep a minute account of every thing you know on the subject, of what he said on hearing of my appointment before my arrival, down to the moment of it, & afterwards: such as that the measure could not succeed that Ross’s resolutions ought to be adopted &c. As also what he said afterwards, especially after Mr Marbois called on him while we were there stating that Mr Marbois told him that the govt had resolved on the cession, it appearing to be the first intelligence, his regretting that I had arrived to take from him his due &c, attributing to his memoirs &c the result, not to the measures of the government. I think that gentn has completely seperated himself from his govt, & that his mov’ments ought to be attended to, to prevent his doing mischief. Perhaps the opportunity may not be offered him, but you who have sound & pure objects in view, who have known his past & present conduct, ought to be attentive to his future” (The Papers of James Monroe, vol. 5). Skipwith replied to this letter on 11 September 1803, stating that he and Joel Barlow had met with Livingston, and that Livingston said that he would endorse the guarantee as a show of support for Monroe, even though he disapproved of it.

The Papers of James Monroe also provides the text of the 20 August 1803 Instrument of Guarantee proffered by Monroe and Livingston: “We the undersigned Ministers Plenipotentiary & Envoy Extraordinary of the U. States of America to the French Republic hereby engage to guaranty on the part of the United States, by virtue of the within powers (the Act of Congress & the Presidents & Secretary of the Treasurys powers) any sum or sums of money not exceeding the amount of ten millions of livres which the house of Hope & Co may pay in advance to the Govt of France on account of the convention between that house & the Govt of France for the purchase of the stock to be created by the Congress of the United States in compliance with the treaty & conventions between the said US. & the French Republic for & in consideration of the cession of Louisiana to the former by the latter power, which treaty & conventions bear date on the 30 of April of the present year. The object of this guarantee is to indemnify the said company in any payment it may immediately make by an anticipation or otherwise to the govt of France of any sum not exceeding the said amount of ten millions of livres for the purchase of the said stock by said Company of said Govt to be created by the U. S. on the principles & in compliance with the treaty & conventions abovementioned.”

On the last day of August 1803, Monroe reported on the issue to Secretary of State James Madison. “In consequence of a late application from Mr Marbois I have executed an act of guarantee in favor of Hope & Co for 10 Millions of livres, on which if Mr^r Livingston joins in it, the French Government will be able to command that sum of that Company on account of the stock to be created under our treaty with France. It was understood in the commencement of the Negotiation by Mr Marbois, and in every subsequent stage, that I would (so far as depended on me) give such a guarantee if it should be desired by his government, which idea was again suggested on the 7 of June as you were apprized in my letter of [8 June]. It was therefore impossible for me to refuse it on the late application, especially as I could see no objection to it, of such weight as to counterbalance the arguments in its favor. I consider the measure, if carried into effect in the manner proposed, as making perfectly secure the Cession of Louisiana to the United States. This Govt cannot object to it on principle if it was disposed so to do: But I cannot concieve that it is so disposed. … By Mr Livingstons letter to me it appears that he has shewn a disposition to throw the whole responsibility of this act on me, from which I am not inclined to shrink so far as it is properly attributable to me; tho’ in my answer I took occasion to intimate that I did not fully accede to his doctrine. I have transmitted to him the instrument with my signiture which if executed by him will be effectual to the object intended by it.” (The Papers of James Monroe, vol. 5).

Livingston wrote to Madison on 10 December 1803 to tell that he had completed the arrangements for the payment of the guarantee. By the end of the year, the United States had taken formal possession of Louisiana.

PROVENANCE:

Sotheby's New York, 24 November 1980, lot 219 (undesignated consignor) — Mrs. Charles W. Engelhard (Christie's New York, 26 January 1996, lot 173)